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What can evolutionary theory tell us?
What can we expect our evolutionary history to tell us about human repro-
ductive and family life? Each of us is a descendant of an unbroken line of
males and females who survived to adulthood and somehow managed to mate
and produce at least one oﬀspring who also survived to adulthood, mated,
and so on.
For most economists, the hypothesis that human preferences are designed
to maximize reproductive success even over some long horizon seems so un-
likely as to receive no consideration at all. Indeed the axiomatic foundations
of economists’ consumer theory would give little oﬀense to the most devout
of creationists. If pressed on this question, scientiﬁcally inclined economists
tend to take the view that we humans are diﬀerent from the rest of the animal
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1kingdom in that our preferences have been hijacked by the pleasure centers
of our minds. Thus we have arrived at “utility functions” that value produc-
tion of children as one of many consumer goods rather than as a reason for
existence. Therefore they would argue, there is little of interest to be learned
from our evolutionary history.
Exhibit A for this viewpoint is the “demographic transition”. What possi-
ble evolutionary explanation can there be for the low birth rates found among
prosperous people in wealthy modern countries. The evidence that modern
Western families are not behaving in such a way as to maximize their number
of children, or even number of grandchildren seems simply overwhelming.
There is compelling evidence that humans care about things other than
the production of oﬀspring. But when we think about it, the preferences that
over the long haul result in the most surviving descendants are not likely to
be preferences focussed entirely on having children, or even grandchildren.
The problem of how to produce the largest possible number of descendants
is an extremely diﬃcult problem in intertemporal allocation and strategic
interaction with others. Moreover, the data that an individual is able to
gather by life experience is small compared to the cumulative information
that has been experienced by our genome over the course of evolutionary
history. Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels [18] express this viewpoint as
follows.
Much as a computer program uses its processing power to
maximize a heuristic, Nature has designed us, through the trial
and error of evolution to use our cognition in maximizing a utility
function. If Nature trusted our cognition equally in all situations,
she could achieve her optimum with a classical utility function.
However she does not. For example, she has “learned” through
2the course of evolution that we often have valuable information
about when a method of hunting ... is productive. But she has
also “learned” that her knowledge of nutrition as gathered is suf-
ﬁciently good as to make her more skeptical of ... information we
may think relevant to the choice of what or how much to consume
once food is available. ...Nature might be quite respectful of an
agent’s information about appropriate courtship behavior, but
less easily convinced that a readily available sexual opportunity
should be forgone.”
It is obvious that a preference for getting pregnant whenever possible
would not serve a female’s long term reproductive interests, since this strat-
egy is unlikely to maximize the number of healthy children who themselves
survive to reproduce. In principle, we could imagine that evolution might
produce females whose utility functions depended only on their expected
long term reproductive success. For such a utility function to be successful,
it would have to be accompanied by a good understanding of the way that op-
timal birth intervals depend on observed environmental variables along with
the ability to measure the relevant environmental variables and to calculate
the implied optimum strategy.
But this may be too much to ask. Finding optimal birth spacings in
every circumstance is an enormously complex problem and one for which the
information directly available from personal experience is likely to be less
useful than the cumulative experience of the generations. Instead of giving
her preferences that focus entirely on ultimate reproductive success, nature
may do better by endowing her with preferences that include desires for good
food and for rest and relaxation as direct objectives. As Alan Rogers suggests,
[17] an appropriately calibrated preference for these amenities would impel
3her to acquire the strength needed to take care of her children and the health
to bear strong infants. A preference for accumulating durable goods and
social contacts that would help get her family through hard times would also
serve her well.
Males would face tradeoﬀs between spending their eﬀorts trying to get
females pregnant and acquiring resources that attract women help to sus-
tain their children. Thus it is plausible that natural selection would endow
humans of both sexes with preferences that value consumption goods and
material wealth as well as children. The hypothesis that I propose for con-
sideration is that, although nature has given us preferences that proximally
rather than directly to reproductive ends, these preferences are calibrated by
nature in such a way that they approximately maximize expected reproduc-
tion in the long run. I do not expect this hypothesis to be entirely vindicated.
But it may be close enough to correct so as to give us an understanding of
human preferences that would be otherwise hard to come by.
The evolutionary hypothesis seems to do quite well in explaining some
fundamental characteristics of human behavior that are hard to explain in
any other way. In previous papers, I have discussed the predictions that
evolutionary theory makes about cooperation and conﬂict between siblings
[3] [4]. In another paper, my son Carl (who is an evolutionary biologist)
and I have discussed the biology and economics of conﬂict between parents
and children [5]. Alan Rogers has proposed an interesting evolutionary ex-
planation why humans and other animals discount the future relative to the
present and [16] future generations relative to their own. Robert Trivers’
book, Social Evolution [19] explores a variety of implications of the evolu-
tionary hypothesis with original and thought-provoking examples ranging
widely over the animal kingdom. Today I will spend most of my time on the
4question of what evolutionary theory might tell us to expect about conﬂict
and cooperation between husbands and wives.
Measuring reproductive success
A reasonable ﬁrst cut at measuring reproductive success is the expected num-
ber of oﬀspring who survive to adulthood. But some qualiﬁcations should be
considered. What if children with fewer siblings are healthier and more pros-
perous and thus have more children themselves? What if parents with grown
children divert their energies from having babies of their own to helping raise
grandchildren? In principle, the number of grandchildren who reach adult-
hood would be a better measure of reproductive success. If there are tradeoﬀs
between number of grandchildren and number of great-grandchildren, then
long run evolutionary success would favor actions that maximize the number
of great-grandchildren, and so on.
For many purposes, measuring direct reproductive success by the number
of grandchildren who survive to adulthood may be an adequate approxima-
tion. But there are important exceptions. In other work, I have argued that
with some patterns of property rights, such as primogeniture, not all grand-
children or even great-grandchildren count equally toward one’s long term
reproductive success. In this case, I show how one can solve a dynamic op-
timization problem that assigns appropriate value functions to each possible
type of descendant. Individuals then seek to maximize a weighted sum of
the numbers of their oﬀspring of each type, where the weights are given by
the value functions which can be solved for.
The chances that our ancestors in the direct line survived to reproduce
successfully typically depended not only on the behavior of their own parents
5and grandparents, but on the amount of help they got from brothers and
sisters and uncles and aunts as well as surviving grandparents. If behavior
toward one’s near relatives is inherited, what does our evolutionary history
imply about the amount of concern that humans can be expected to show
toward their relatives?
In 1964, the great evolutionary biologist, William D. Hamilton [12] pro-
posed a systematic answer to this question–an answer that has come to be
known as Hamilton’s Rule. Biologists deﬁne the “coeﬃcient of relatedness”
between two animals of the same species to be the probability that a rare
“gene” found in one of these animals will also appear in the other. For
sexual diploids if mating is between unrelated individuals, the coeﬃcient of
relatedness between two full siblings is 1/2, that between half-siblings is 1/4,
that between an individual and a full sibling’s child is 1/4, that between
full cousins is 1/8, that between parent and oﬀspring is 1/2, that between
grandparent and grandchild is 1/4, and so on. Hamilton proposes that natu-
ral selection would produce individuals who try to maximize inclusive ﬁtness
where inclusive ﬁtness is deﬁned to be a weighted sum of one’s own reproduc-
tive success and that of one’s siblings, half-siblings, and cousins of various
types, where the weights are coeﬃcients of relatedness.1 (Of course some
care has to be taken to avoid double-counting of say, one’s children’s ﬁtness
and that of one’s grandchildren.)
Hamilton stated his rule as follow:
The social behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in
each behaviour-evoking situation the individual will seem to value
1More recent theoretical work [7] [11] [3] has shown that Hamilton’s rule is strictly
correct only where the beneﬁts and costs from interaction between relatives take a linear
form.
6his neighbor’s ﬁtness against his own according to the coeﬃcient
of relatedness appropriate to the situation.
Hamilton’s rule implies that when faced with the option of sacriﬁcing c
units of its own reproductive success in order to increase the success of a
relative whose coeﬃcient of relatedness is k, by b units, the decision maker
should make the sacriﬁce if it passes the beneﬁt-cost test kb > c.
Conﬂict and Cooperation between Parents
Let us explore the implications of the hypothesis of inclusive ﬁtness maxi-
mization for relations between the sexes. To parents who seek to maximize
inclusive ﬁtness, the health and well-being of a child whom they have to-
gether conceived is what economists call a public good. The child’s welfare
is “jointly consumed” by the two parents, much like the shared heat of a
common ﬁre. Contributions that one parent makes to the child’s welfare also
beneﬁt the other.
Economists make much of the “free-rider problem” with public goods.
The problem is that selﬁsh individuals when deciding how much to contribute
to the shared public good do not properly account for the fact that their
own contribution the others. Let us pursue the common ﬁre analogy a bit
further. Consider two selﬁsh foragers who subsist on berries and who share
the warmth of a single ﬁre. Alice is relatively good at picking berries and
Bob is relatively good at collecting wood. Without some kind of explicit
cooperation, an equilibrium outcome would occur where Bob gathers some
wood and spends the rest of his time picking and eating berries. Alice gathers
no wood, but picks berries and eats them. Bob gathers just enough wood so
that the extra warmth generated gained by an extra hour’s wood-gathering
7would give him less beneﬁt than the berries that he could pick or eat in
that hour. Since Alice is better at berry-picking relative to wood-gathering
than Bob, she will not want to sacriﬁce berry-picking to gather any wood in
addition to that collected by Bob. This outcome, however, is not eﬃcient,
since Bob’s decision of when to stop gathering wood does not account for
the fact that Alice will also beneﬁt from a warmer ﬁre. Both could gain
if Alice and Bob agreed to a deal in which Bob gathers some more wood
than he would choose on his own account and Alice rewards him with some
berries. Such an agreement may be possible if the relationship between Alice
and Bob is durable, but even then it requires that a bargain be reached. If
neither knows the other’s true willingness to pay, then in general there is no
assurance that they will reach an eﬃcient bargain.
Things would be quite diﬀerent if all that Alice and Bob really cared
about was building as large and lasting a ﬁre as possible. They would of
course still want to consume berries in order to give themselves strength to
gather ﬁrewood. In this case, Alice and Bob would have no disagreements
about how to allocate resources. Although berries eaten by one can not be
eaten by the other, these berries are valued only in the way that a factory
values inputs into the production of the output it desires. It might well be
that the eﬃcient way to produce the biggest ﬁre is for Bob to spend all of
his time gathering ﬁrewood and for Alice to give him berries to sustain his
strength. No bargaining will be needed to sustain this outcome. There is no
conﬂict of interest and no need to higgle over the “price” of Bob’s services.
Since their interests coincide, Alice will want to choose to allocate her eﬀorts
between picking berries for herself, picking berries for Bob, and gathering
ﬁrewood in exactly the same way that Bob would have her do it if Bob could
dictate her activity.
8Can a similar story apply to a man and woman bound in a lifelong monog-
amous relationship? Suppose, for example, that evolution has shaped the
preferences of each parent to be concerned only with the number of his or
her surviving grandchildren? Parents would value their own consumption and
well-being only as instruments toward that end. They would desire goods
and leisure for themselves, but only for the reason that these increase their
own, health, strength, and longevity, so that they can better produce and
care for their children and grandchildren. In this case, there is no free-rider
problem. Because they are fully monogamous, they share exactly the same
line of descendants. Because they care only about their private consumptions
as instruments for producing grandchildren, their interests about the alloca-
tion of private goods and public goods in the household are coincide exactly.
With such harmony of reproductive interest, we could expect natural selec-
tion to favor the development of aﬀection and caring between spouses. This
is perhaps the one case where the biblical injunction, ”love thy neighbor as
thyself” might be consistent with the evolved nature of humans.
Having started with an idealized model of harmonious marriage based on
identity of interest, let us consider the elements of discord that enter the pic-
ture as we add more elements of reality. Even where mating is monogamous
and lifelong, the genetic interests of inclusive-ﬁtness maximizing husbands
and wives do not exactly coincide. A major source of dissonance, often
noted in popular culture, is “the inlaw problem”. Evolutionary theory sug-
gests that individuals will value the fertility of their siblings at half the value
they place on their own fertility. Thus neither the husband nor the wife will
be wholeheartedly devoted to the well-being of their own line of descendants,
but each will sometimes be willing to divert resources to needy siblings and
other relatives. Since the relatives of the wife are typically not closely related
9to the husband and vice versa, we can expect even the most monogamous
couples to disagree about when to help the inlaws.
Through most of our evolutionary history, the death rates of men and
women in their prime reproductive years were high. Thus there was a signiﬁ-
cant chance that one partner would die and that the surviving partner would
remarry and have children with another partner. This eﬀect would drive
another wedge between the reproductive interests of husbands and wives.
And, I don’t suppose that this would have occurred to anyone in this au-
dience, but what about adultery? Consider a society in which all marriages
were thoroughly monogamous and where husbands and wives wholeheart-
edly pursued their joint reproductive interest. What a great reproductive
opportunity this would present for a philandering male. If he can impreg-
nate someone else’s wife her mate’s knowledge, then at a very small cost
to himself he passes his genes to a child who will be well cared for by the
woman and her cuckolded husband. The situation is nicely posed in a paper
by anthropologists, Kristen Hawkes, Alan Rogers, and Eric Charnov in a
paper called “The male’s dilemma: Increased oﬀspring production is more
paternity to steal.” [13]. These authors suggest that in equilibrium we can
expect to see males spending some time philandering, some time guarding
their mates from philanders, and some time providing resources for their
mates’ children.
But sometimes it may be in the biological interest of a woman to cooper-
ate in cuckolding her husband. It may be that the interloper is able to give
the additional resources for her children beyond those provided by her hus-
band. Evolutionary psychologists have proposed another possibility (see for
example Helen E. Fisher’s provocative Anatomy of Love: A Natural History
of Mating, Marriage, and Why We Stray)[10]; that women are evolved to
10seek both “good genes” and a “good provider” for their children, but that it
is only the unusually lucky woman who ﬁnds both in the same man. Thus
many women have to settle for marrying a man who is less healthy or less
attractive, or less prestigious than they would like. Such a woman if given
the chance, can expect to increase her long term reproductive success by
getting good genes from a secret coupling with a more attractive male, while
obtaining child support from her puny husband.
Sometimes, too, a philandering male may impregnant a woman against
a married woman against her will. Even though she may have resisted, a
woman may conceal the rape from her husband in hopes that that he will be
more willing to help her care for the child if he believes it is his own.
For widows or divorced women who remarry, the conﬂict of reproductive
interests with their new mates is especially transparent. The new husband
has no genetic interest in his wife’s earlier children and thus there is direct
conﬂict of interest over the amount of time and energy she devotes to them.
Fortunately, human males are not as resolute about this matter as male lions
or chimpanzees, who when encountering a nursing mother whom they have
not bred are likely to kill the infant in order to bring the mother into oestrus
so that they can breed her. But some of these inclinations seem to persist
in our species. Evolutionary psychologists, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson’s
[9] present convincing statistical evidence that child abuse by stepfathers is
far more frequent than by biological fathers or by mothers.2j
Evolutionary psychologists have attempted to draw inferences about the
evolutionary history of human mating patterns by comparative study across
2There are also a number of studies by economists showing that children raised by
stepfathers are much more likely to end up in trouble with the law and other problem
behaviors. [8], [2]
11primate species of correlations between physical characteristics and mating
patterns. The idea that one could learn something about our inherited psy-
chology from measurable characteristics of our anatomy is intriguing, though
it seems to me that the evidence that has been collected is spotty. Whether
or not this approach is useful, you may ﬁnd it thought-provoking, or perhaps
amusing. Among mammals in general and particularly among primates,
there tends to be a positive correlation between the size ratio of males to
females and the degree of polygyny practiced in mating. The standard ex-
planation is that in highly polygynous species, the only males who are able to
mate are the strongest ﬁghters. Thus males achieve a size larger than would
be optimal. Among the primates, gorillas and orangutans are highly polyg-
ynous, with most females belonging to harems attached to a single male. In
contrast, gibbons are thoroughly monogamous. Chimpanzees and bonobos
on the other hand are highly promiscuous. Typically every male in the group
gets to mate with an ovulating female.3 Sexual dimorphism in size is most
pronounced among the polygynous gorillas and orangutans where the males
are about twice as large as the females. In contrast male and female gibbons
are almost exactly the same size and chimpanzee males are only about 6%
larger than females. The size diﬀerence between male and female humans
is greater than that of chimpanzees, but much less than that of gorillas or
orangutans. This has been construed as an indication that that our species
through most of its history has been moderately polygynous.
A second correlation that has been observed among mammal species leads
3This serves the females reproductive interests by giving each of the males in her group
a probabilistic stake in her infant. If a chimpanzee meets a mother and her infant from
another group, and if he hasn’t copulated with the mother before the infant was born, he
is likely to kill the infant.
12to the “testicle test”. It is claimed that the more promiscuous the species,
the larger the males’ testes. The apparent reason for this is that in highly
promiscuous species, where ovulating females typically copulate with many
males, the male that is able to deliver the most sperm has a competitive
advantage over the others. Gorillas, while polygynous are not at all promis-
cuous. Female gorillas reportedly do not engage in extracurricular sex. Male
gorillas have small testicles, smaller in absolute size than those of humans.
In contrast, for the promiscuous chimpanzees and bonobos, sperm competi-
tion is intense and the males have very large testicles, 5 to 10 times as large
relative to their body size as those of gorillas.
This exercise in comparative anatomy suggests that humans fall some-
where between gorillas and chimpanzees, both with respect to polygyny and
with respect to promiscuity. This view is in accord with anthropologists’ ob-
servations of modern hunter-gatherers. It seems to me that it may be futile
to seek a single evolutionary background for human mating behavior. While
each of the other primate species seems to have a fairly narrow characteris-
tic mating pattern, we see great variation in human institutions. Polygyny,
monogamy, polyandry, all with varying degrees of promiscuity have been
observed as stable institutions in human populations. Even within single
societies, there are wide variations in mating behavior across individuals. It
is plausible that this variable pattern has characterized our species for a long
time and that we have developed ways of adapting our behavior to optimize
reproductive success in a variety of institutional surroundings.
Conﬂict over Number of Children
One of the problems for which social scientists might hope to get some guid-
ance from evolutionary biology is in trying to understand the determinants
13of human reproduction rates. Thus it will be interesting to explore the con-
ﬂicts and commonality of genetic self-interest between husband and wife as
regards the spacing of births and the number of children that they conceive.
A ﬁrst thought on the matter might be: Natural selection is likely to result
in men wanting more children than their wives. After all, there is little doubt
that the wife almost always bears a larger share of the cost of producing a
child. She alone must bear the physical burden of pregnancy, and of lac-
tation. Typically she must also assume a much greater share of the labor
of child care than her husband. And over most of our evolutionary history,
women assumed a high risk of death with each childbirth. Thus it is plausible
that husbands, who bear smaller costs, but pass the same number of genes
to their children will want more children than their wives do.
But wait a minute. Remember the foragers, Alice and Bob. Bob was
relatively good at wood gathering and did all or most of the work on the
ﬁre. But if the fundamental objective of both is to maximize the size of the
ﬁre, then Alice and Bob would be in perfect agreement about how to allocate
their time between berry-picking and ﬁre-tending and hence about how big
the ﬁre should be. In a perfectly monogamous marriage where both partners
are focussed on reproductive success, there will be the same unanimity of
interest with respect to questions of birth-spacing and number of children.
If the only children that either spouse will ever have are children they have
together, then the reproductive beneﬁt to the husband from prolonging the
interval between births is the same as those to the wife. If the wife dies in
childbirth, not only will all of her potential future fertility be lost, but so will
all of his. If adding a new child to the family reduces the amount of food
and attention given to her other children, these are also his children. Thus
he has exactly the same incentives for reproductive restraint that she has.
14Matters are less harmonious if there is uncertainty about the paternity
of previous and future children. At the time when a new conception is con-
sidered, a woman who already has some children must weigh the expected
long term success of another child against the loss in reproductive success to
her previously born children as she redirects resources from them to the new
child and as she risks her life in childbirth. While the mother has the same
genetic stake in her previous children as she would have in the new one, her
husband would discount the costs to these children by the probability that
these previous children are not his. Moreover, if he is not certain that his
wife’s future children will be his own, he would place a lower weight on the
risk to her life in childbirth on this account.
These considerations suggest that our species might have evolved in such
a way that on average, husbands want to get their wives pregnant more often
than the wives would choose if it were up to them. If this is the case, then
there are some interesting consequences. If the choice of birth spacing be-
comes a tug-of-war between husbands and wives with the outcome the result
of opposing tugs, then we might expect each sex to evolve preferences that
exaggerate the diﬀerence in true genetic interests. Men would desire more
children and women fewer children than their own genetic interest dictates
because in the conﬂict between husband and wife, outcomes are pulled away
from the preferred outcome of each in the direction of his or her partner’s
preferred outcome.
Gary Becker [1] and his followers have attempted to explain the demo-
graphic transition from very high birth rates to very low birth rates in Europe
and more recently in much of Asia as rational responses of well-informed de-
cision makers to changes in incomes and relative prices. The argument is that
while the time cost of producing goods has fallen, the time cost of producing
15children has not changed very much. Thus as the relative cost of children
has increased, the number of children demanded has decreased. This argu-
ment would be more convincing if real income had not changed over the time
spanning the demographic transition. But, in fact, income has increased
enormously. In order for the substitution eﬀect on the demand for children
to overwhelm the income eﬀect so as to reduce the number of children de-
manded, either children would have to be an ”inferior good” with income
reducing demand for them, or demand for children would have to be highly
price elastic and the income elasticity would have to be close to zero. The
hypothesis that the income elasticity of demand for children is small or even
negative would be consistent with cross-sectional and time series data on hu-
man reproduction in developed countries over the last few decades. But it is
very diﬃcult to see how evolution could have selected for such behavior, un-
less indeed our minds have hi-jacked our preferences and replaced biological
ﬁtness by personal comfort as a human objective.
The divergence between men’s and women’s reproductive interests sug-
gests an alternative to Becker’s rational choice explanation. If reproductive
outcomes are not the choice of a single rational agent, but rather the re-
sult of a tug-of-war between two divergent preferences, then that changes in
birth rates could arise when one side or the other gains increased leverage
in this tug-of-war. The balance of forces in times and places with exception-
ally high birth rates, such as 19th and early 20th century Europe, may have
given males the upper hand in household decisions. In more recent times, the
economic and social power of women has increased signiﬁcantly. Consumer
studies [6] [15] [14] indicate that increases in female incomes have increased
women’s bargaining power within the household. Perhaps then what we are
seeing is not so much the eﬀect of a change in relative prices on the demands
16of a single rational consumer, but instead a shift in inﬂuence from consumers
with one set of preferences to consumers with another.
References
[1] Gary Becker. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Ma, 1981.
[2] Kelly Bedard and Heather Antecol. Does single parenthood increase
the probability of teenage promiscuity, drug use and crime? Technical
report, UC Santa Barbara, 2002.
[3] Theodore Bergstrom. On the evolution of altruistic ethical rules for
siblings. American Economic Review, 85(1):58–81, March 1995.
[4] Theodore Bergstrom and Oded Stark. How altruism can prevail in an
evolutionary environment. American Economic Review, 83(2):149–155,
May 1993.
[5] Theodore C. Bergstrom and Carl T. Bergstrom. Does mother nature
punish rotten kids. Journal of Bioeconomics, 1(1):47–72, 1999.
[6] Bourguignon Fran¸ ois Chiappori Pierre-Andr´ e Browning, Martin and
Val´ erie Lechene. Incomes and outcomes: A structural model of intra-
household allocation. Journal of Political Economy, 1994.
[7] L. Cavalli-Sforza, Luigi and Marcus W. Feldman. Darwinian selection
and “altruism”. Theoretical Population Biology, 14:268–280, 1978.
17[8] William Comanor and Llad Phillips. The impact of income and family
structure on delinquency. Journal of Applied Economics, 5(2):209–232,
2002.
[9] Martin Daly and Margo Wilson. Homicide. Aldine de Gruyter, New
York, 1988.
[10] Helen E. Fisher. Anatomy of Love: A Natural History of Mating, Mar-
riage, and Why We Stray. Fawcett Columbine, 1992.
[11] Alan Grafen. The hawk-dove game played between relatives. Animal
Behaviour, 27(3):905–907, 1979.
[12] William D. Hamilton. The genetical evolution of social behavior, i and
ii. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1):1–52, July 1964.
[13] Kristen Hawkes, Allan Rogers, and Eric Charnov. The male’s dilemma:
Increased oﬀspring production is more paternity to steal. Evolutionary
Ecology, 9:662–677, 1994.
[14] John Hoddinott and L. Haddad. Does female income share inﬂuence
household expenditures: Evidence from the cote d’ ivoire. Oxford Bul-
letin of Economics and Statistics, 57:77–96, 1995.
[15] Marjorie McElroy. The empirical content of nash-bargained household
behavior. Journal of Human Resources 25, 25:559–583, 1990.
[16] Alan Rogers. Evolution of time preference by natural selection. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 84(3):460–481, 1994.
[17] Alan Rogers. For love or money: The evolution of reproductive and
material motivations. In R. Dunbar, editor, Human Reproductive De-
18cisions: Biological and Biosocial Perspectives, pages 76–95. Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1994.
[18] Larry Samuelson and Jeroen Swinkels. Information and the evolution
of the utility function. Technical report, University of Wisconsin, 2002.
[19] Robert Trivers. Social Evolution. Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park,
California, 1985.
19